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ABSTRACT 
Purpose -This paper investigates the extent of compliance with international best practice corporate 
governance principles by Botswana Unified Revenue Service (BURS), a State Owned Enterprise (SOE). The 
researchers wonder why in this modern day and age, architects (parliamentarians) of the Act of parliament 
which brought about governance structures of BURS, chose to depart from what is considered international 
best practice governance as recommended under codes of best practice corporate governance such as the 
King Code 2002. Second, the researchers also wonder whether the departure was by design or an oversight 
on the part of the architects of BURS governance structure. 
Design/methodology/approach - Using content analysis, the BURS Act 2004 and the King Code 2002 are 
content analysed to draw parallels between governance structures recommended by the two governance 
instruments. 
Findings – The findings of this study indicate a low level of compliance with international best practice 
corporate governance by BURS. 
Practical implications - The researchers conclude that divergence of governance structures of BURS from 
international best practice has the potential to breed inter alia; incompetence, corruption, maladministration, 
dominance, cronyism and ultimately a weak institution. 
Originality/value – Prior literature tends to investigate governance practices of public listed companies. This 
study contributes to governance literature by examining governance practices of a state owned enterprise 
which came into existence through an act of parliament. 
Keywords : Corporate Governance ;Parastatal Organisation ; State Owned Enterprise/Parastatal ; 
Governance Structure ; Board of Directors. 
Paper type Case study 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Best practice corporate governance principles such as the UK Combined Code (2003), the South African King Report 
(commonly known as King Code) (1994, 2002, 2009), Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) principles of corporate governance (2004), Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance Principles 
(CACG) (1999) among others, consider the board of directors as the focal point of corporate governance in a company. 
The board is also tasked with the responsibility to collectively provide effective corporate governance that involves 
managing the relationships between the management of the company, its board, its shareholders and other relevant 
stakeholders. 
As such, various factors, such as size, composition, culture (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 2005) qualifications of 
directors, appointment and remuneration among others, may therefore influence the effectiveness of the board in its 
oversight functions (Beasley, 1996). In addition, the board guides and monitors the business and affairs of the company 
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on behalf of the shareholders by whom they are elected and to whom they are accountable (King Report, 1994, 2002, 
2009). It [board] also has the responsibility to set the company‟s strategic aims, supervise the management team and 
report to the owners of the company on their stewardship (Cadbury Committee, 1992). 
The researchers argue that in Botswana, the ability of boards of directors of state owned enterprises (“SEOs”)/parastatal 
organisations to effectively discharge their oversight functions is severely compromised. This contention is elicited by 
the governance structures of SOEs which are prescribed by Acts of Parliament which ‘gave birth’ to these corporations. 
The researchers maintain that recommendations from the Botswana Unified Revenue Service (BURS) Act (2004a)  [in 
particular] are in conflict with international best practice corporate governance as recommended under the UK 
Combined Code (2003), the King Code (1994; King Report, 2002; King Report, 2009), Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles of corporate governance (2004), Commonwealth Association of 
Corporate Governance Principles (CACG) (1999) inter alia. Perhaps the architects/parliamentarians of the BURS Act 
(2004) never intended the governance structure of BURS to meet such high standards of governance because it [BURS] 
is a creation of an Act of the parliament of Botswana (mandatory). The researchers ponder why in this modern day and 
age, the architects of the BURS Act (2004), chose to depart from what researchers [in corporate governance] consider 
international best practice governance as recommended under codes of best practice corporate governance (e.g. 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). The researchers also wonder whether this departure was an error of judgement on 
the part of the Botswana parliamentarians or it was a deliberate act to uphold poor governance practices of lack of; 
independence, transparency, accountability and responsibility; cronyism in management of SOEs, weak monitoring 
systems, payment of facilitation fees [bribes] and external influence by politicians prevalent in many SOEs in the 
African continent (Okeahalam, 2004). 
To this end, this paper seeks to; first, generate debate on the ability of governance structures, in particular boards of 
directors of SOEs to effectively discharge their oversight functions. 
Second, the researchers endeavour through this debate, to [possibly] influence changes to corporate governance 
structures of SOEs in Botswana by demonstrating the possible weaknesses in corporate governance, stemming from the 
governance structures of SOEs as recommended by Acts of Parliament. Third, the researchers hope that this debate may 
influence parliamentarians in future to consider the implications for the entire country, of crafting governance structures 
(through Acts of Parliament) which concentrate power in the hands of a single individual. Finally, the researchers hope 
that the debate may conscientise architects of Acts of parliament that, poor governance practices may create negative 
perceptions in the minds of local and international investors on the appropriateness of a country as a safe and suitable 
destination for investment capital, ultimately scuppering efforts geared towards foreign direct investment (FDI). 
In order to generate this debate, the paper quantitatively investigates the extent of divergence between the BURS Act 
(2004) and the King Code (2002) through a self-constructed checklist (See appendix 1: the South African King Code 
Checklist (SAKCC)). The SAKCC contains 44 corporate governance provisions based on the five main sections of 
King Code (2002) covering: boards and directors, risk management, internal audit, integrated sustainability reporting 
and accounting and auditing. The BURS Act (2004) prescribes the governance structure of BURS as follows; from 
board appointment and removal, board composition, director qualification, remuneration, tenure of directors, duties and 
responsibilities of directors among others. The researchers hasten to caution that this paper does not seek to question the 
legality and or lack thereof of the BURS Act (2004) as instituted by the Parliament of Botswana under the system of 
parliamentary democracy.   
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or parastatal organisations, are arm‟s length corporate entities established to pursue 
public policy and commercial objectives (Bozec, 2005, p. 1922).  SOEs may be wholly owned by federal government 
or provincial government and are similar to private firms in the way they operate and function. Unlike public limited 
corporations, SOEs do not have major CG control devices   such as a market for corporate control and they are 
normally monopolies. SOEs don‟t have shares issued to the public and are thus not exposed to pressure from the stock 
market (risk of takeover) (Bozec, 2005, p. 1929). They are financed wholly or in part from state resources, normally get 
the state as guarantor if funded from external sources, hence no pressure from creditors.  
BURS, a Botswana SOE, was chosen for this study because the organisation is critical to the economy of the country 
through its tax collection service. According to BURS (2015) over the past five years, tax revenue as a proportion of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been more or less stable at around 20% and  tax revenue as a proportion 
of government budget has been increasing consistently since 2005/06, signifying the growing importance of the tax 
revenue in the economy (BURS, 2015). As such, BURS is an important integral component in economic development 
of Botswana. Revenue collected by BURS goes towards construction of infrastructure such as schools, roads, hospitals 
and other physical infrastructure and also towards human resource and social development of the people of Botswana. 
The researchers considered it important to investigate governance structures of BURS in line with international best 
practice taking into account the critical role it plays in the economy of Botswana.  
The King Code (2002) is used as a standard for best practice corporate governance for the following reasons; first, 
although Botswana has a code of corporate governance, [the Botswana Code of Corporate Governance (BCCG) of 
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2013], the BCCG Code was developed long after the BURS Act of (2004). Second, the BURS Act (2004) was 
developed two years after the second review of the first King Report (1994). In a way the second King Report (2002) 
could have been used as guide to develop the BURS Act (2004). Third, companies in Botswana tend to adopt codes 
from other countries in an endeavour to address corporate governance issues. In particular, the South African King 
Report is generally used as a standard for best practice corporate governance in Botswana. Fourth, several companies 
doing business in Botswana are headquartered in South Africa, hence are required by their head offices to adhere to the 
King Code of South Africa. In a way, the appropriateness of the King Code (2002) as a standard for best practice 
corporate governance in Botswana is therefore not in doubt.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline BURS governance structure as prescribed by 
BURS Act (2004). In Section 3 the literature and theoretical framework is surveyed. Section 4 deals with methodology 
while Section 5 presents empirical results and section 6 discusses BURS governance structure and potential governance 
problems. Concluding remarks are in Section 7.  
2. ABOUT BURS 
BURS is a quasi-independent SOE whose mandate  is „to perform tax assessment and collection functions on behalf of 
the Government and to take appropriate measures to counteract tax evasion on the one hand, and to improve taxpayer 
service to a much higher level on the other‟ (BURS, 2004b). BURS derives its mandate from the BURS Act (2014) (the 
Act). It is a body corporate capable of suing and being sued at law (BURS Act 17 of 2004, ss 3). In fulfilment of its 
mandate the BURS Act has empowered BURS to: Administer and enforce the revenue laws; Promote compliance with 
the revenue laws; Take such measures as may be required to improve service given to taxpayers with view to improving 
efficiency and maximizing revenue collection; Take such measures such as may be required to counteract tax fraud and 
other forms of tax evasion; Advise the Minister on matters relating to the administration and collection of tax; and 
Perform such other functions in relation to tax as the Minister may direct (BURS, 2014). 
BURS is headed by a commissioner general whose task is to ensure that BURS executes its mandate as stipulated by 
the Act. BURS has two core business units, the Internal Revenue Division (IRD) which is headed by a Commissioner 
Internal Revenue (CIR) and is charged with the responsibility of administration of Income Tax, Value Added Tax and 
Capital Transfer Tax. The division is also mandated with other functions like debt management, taxpayer audit, 
investigation and collection of intelligence information and risk analysis. The second core unit of BURS, Customs and 
Excise collects customs and excise duties, import value added tax and other levies. It also has the responsibility of 
facilitating legitimate imports and exports, protection of Botswana society against cross-border crime and combating 
unfair and harmful trade practices (BURS, 2014).  
2.1 Governance Structure as Stipulated by the BURS Act (2004)  
BURS is governed by a board of directors [ideally] and according to section 6 of the Act, the board is responsible for 
the direction of the affairs and operations of BURS. BURS board appointments are the prerogative of the minister as 
stipulated in section 7 of the Act. 
The board consists of a chairperson who shall  be the Secretary of Financial Affairs of the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning (“MFDP”), a representative from the Ministry of Trade and Industry and a Commissioner 
General who shall assume the role of chief executive officer (CEO). In addition the board consists of a representative 
from Bank of Botswana (central Bank of Botswana) and three members appointed from the private sector on the basis 
of „knowledge of and experience in, financial affairs, economics, business and legal affairs‟ (see ss 7 (1)(e)). However, 
the Act does not stipulate criteria and or qualifications of; the Secretary of Financial Affairs of the Ministry of Finance 
and Development Planning, representative from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and representative from Bank of 
Botswana. In total, the board shall consist of seven members and may appoint a vice chairperson of the board. All other 
appointments are done [ultimately] by the Minister of Finance and Development Planning (the Minister). 
Functions of the BURS board of directors are stipulated in section 8 of the Act. The Act is thin on the powers and 
functions of the board. The powers of the board are limited to administrative and operational matters. Specifically it 
addresses the right of the board to demand specific information from the commissioner general, giving direction to the 
commissioner general with respect to operational policies and implementation thereof and approval of structures 
necessary to discharge BURS functions and approval of a code of conduct for BURS. 
The Act (see ss 8(2)) specifically prohibits the board from intervening in the determination of any tax assessment; tax 
liability and tax appeal by any taxpayer but does not stipulate who has to deal with such matters. Board members have 
tenure of office of four years and may be reappointed at the end of their term (see ss 9). Disqualification of board 
members is dealt with under section 10 of the Act which stipulates that board members may be disqualified if declared 
bankrupt, convicted of a criminal offence within and without the jurisdiction of Botswana, has a record (proven) of tax 
evasion, has become an employee of BURS or actively engaged in politics either by holding party political office, 
election to either local authority or national assembly (see ss 10 (1) (a) to (e)). 
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Removal of board members is the prerogative of the Minister under whose portfolio BURS falls as stipulated by section 
11 of the Act. Removal of board members could be effected for several reasons such as absence from (without 
reasonable cause) three consecutive meetings of the board, inefficiency, physical or mental incapability which may 
hinder a member from discharging their duties, contravention of the BURS Act, unprofessional conduct as pronounced 
by relevant bodies and failure to declare interests in accordance with section 13 of the Act (see ss 11(1) (a) to (g)). 
Although the Act does not stipulate criteria for appointment of board members except under section 7(1) (e), it 
categorically stipulates that all appointments are the prerogative of the Minister (see ss 7 (1) and ss 12). Section 13 of 
the Act requires board members to disclose their interests with respect to matters before the board if they have direct or 
indirect interest. 
With regard to board meetings, the Act stipulates that the board has the leeway to regulate its own proceedings under 
section 14 (1) and that the board should meet at least four times a year (e.g. ss 14 (2)). Section 14 (4) empowers the 
board chairperson to convene an extraordinary meeting of the board if he/she deems it necessary to do so. Similarly 
under the same section, three or more board members may request the board chair to convene an extraordinary meeting 
of the board. Section 14 (5) stipulates that the quorum at any board meetings shall be four members and that board 
decisions shall be that of the majority of board members at that meeting (see section 14 (7)). In terms of board 
committees the Act mandates the board to appoint committees of a general or special nature as determined by the board 
(see ss 15 (1). This gives the board an opportunity to appoint various board committees if they deem it necessary to do 
so. 
Remuneration of board members is subject to the approval by the Minister as stipulated under section 17, while 
appointment of board secretary is done by the board (ss 18). The secretary will be accountable to the board for his/her 
functions. The board has the ultimate authority to appoint (for a four year term), determine the remuneration of the 
board secretary and terminate his/her appointment as per section 21 (1) to (3). In addition to appointing the board 
secretary the board has the authority to appoint the BURS auditors (section 28 (2)). 
Section 22 of the Act stipulates that the commissioner general or chief executive officer shall be appointed by the 
Minister on recommendation from the board for a period of 5 years which may be renewed if the Minister (not the 
board) deems it necessary to do so under section 24 (1). Clearly, the Minister has the ultimate authority as to who gets 
appointed to this position. The Minister also has the ultimate authority on termination of the commissioner general‟s 
appointment under section 24 (2). BURS as a government entity is financed through appropriations from Parliament 
(see ss 26 (1)).  
In terms of reporting, BURS should report to the Minister six months after the end of the financial year by submitting a 
report of its operations, auditor‟s report accompanied by audited accounts (ss 29 (1)) which shall be tabled before the 
Botswana Parliament by the Minister within three months of receiving the report (ss 29 (3)). The Act is not clear as to 
who between BURS board and BURS management reports to the Minister.  
While section 8 (2) stipulates non-interference of the board in the determination of any tax assessment, tax liability or 
tax appeal by any tax payer, section 31 of the Act on the other hand seems to suggest otherwise. However, it qualifies 
the involvement of board members on determination of exemption, mitigation deferment or remission of any tax by 
stipulating that approval should be sought from the Minister before such actions could be taken. 
3. LITERATURE & THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1 Literature Review 
Literature on corporate governance generally tends to focus on governance practices of public listed corporations. For 
instance, researchers both in the developed and developing world have examined compliance with best practice 
corporate governance codes and firm outcomes. However, most studies on compliance with international best practice 
corporate governance have been conducted in the developed world such as in the UK  (see Arcot et al., 2010; Conyon 
and Mallin, 1997; MacNeil and Li, 2006; Weir and Laing, 2000), Germany (see Talaulicar and v. Werder, 2008; 
Werder et al., 2005), Portugal (see Alves and Mendes, 2004) and Spain (see Fernández-Rodríguez et al., 2004) and 
developing world (e.g. Cyprus by Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006)) and South Africa (e.g. Deutsche Bank, 2002; 
KPMG, 2003; KPMG, 2004; KPMG, 2005; KPMG, 2006; Magang, 2012; Ntim, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012). 
Few, studies have examined corporate governance practices of SOEs. For instance Bozec (2005) examines boards of 
directors, market discipline and performance of SOEs in Canada for the period 1976 to 2000. Using a sample of 25 
SOEs from across industrial sectors, Bozec (2005) conducts a regression analysis of the relationship between 
performance and board characteristics. The study finds a positive relationship between product market competition and 
firm performance, no relationship between board committees (e.g. remuneration and nomination) and performance. The 
study also finds a negative relationship between audit committee and performance. The findings of the study lends 
support to the argument that, exposure of companies to competitive environment enhances effectiveness of boards. 
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Bozec (2005) focusses on SOEs in a developed country; as such findings from Canada may not necessarily be 
applicable to a developing country, like Botswana given the politico, socio and economic differences between these 
countries. The researchers are not aware of studies which have examined corporate governance practices of SOEs 
specifically focussing on Acts of parliament which created SOEs. As such this paper seeks to contribute to the dearth of 
literature on corporate governance in Botswana by specifically researching corporate governance of SOEs and Acts of 
parliament which created these institutions. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
BURS Act (2004) is a creation of the Botswana Parliament. Similar to the UK, Botswana follows a parliamentary 
system of governance. Under this system of governance citizens elect representatives to a legislative parliament to make 
the necessary laws and decisions for the country (StrØM, 2000). Lijphardt (1984; 1992) defines parliamentarianism as a 
form of constitutional democracy in which executive authority emerges from and is responsible to legislative authority. 
This system of governance was borne in modern day Britain (StrØM, 2000). Accountability between the principal and 
agent under parliamentarianism is indirect. For instance the prime minister (or president) and his/her cabinet are 
accountable to any majority of the members of parliament (who in turn are accountable to the voters or principals) and 
can be voted out of office by the latter through a vote of no confidence (Steffani, 1979 cited in Strom 2000). Parliament 
directly represents the people/electorate (principals) and thus acts as agents of the people/electorate and or principals. 
The chain of delegation under this system of governance is arranged as follows; (1) from voters to elected 
representatives/parliamentarians, (2) from legislators to executive branch in particular to the head of government, (3) 
from the head of government to heads of different executive departments (ministers) and (4) from heads of different 
executive departments to civil servants (StrØM, 2000). According to StrØM (2000) civil servants ultimately implement 
public policy under the parlimentary system of governance.  
In the context of BURS the agency relationships as per the system of parliamentary democracy are as follows; (1) the 
electorate/people are the principal owners of BURS while the parliamentarians are their agents (first line of delegation), 
(2) the head of government/president is the agent of parliamentarians (second line of delegation), (3) the ministers (in 
particular MFDP) are agents of the head of executive/president (third line of delegation) and (4) BURS management is 
the agent of the executive in particular MFDP (fourth line of delegation). This creates a single long chain of delegation 
with multiple links where a single principal delegates to a single or multiple noncompeting agents. 
Conventional agency theory maintains that the interests of the agent and those of the principal never fully converge 
because of divorce of ownership and control which leaves management free to run the company as it saw fit (Berle and 
Means, 1932). Managers of contemporary publicly held organisations are not the owners and as such will always 
maximise their own utility as per the classical economics view of man (Burton, 2000). Literature suggests several 
mechanisms to try and align the interests of the agents with those of the principals e.g. outcome based contracts (Fama, 
1980), use information systems to curb agent opportunism (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983), performance 
contracts, managerial labour market (Eisenhardt, 1989) among others. This remedy is used in the context of a company 
where the chain of delegation is from the shareholders to the board of directors and to management. Ultimately 
shareholders may have an opportunity to remove incompetent directors and senior management through a vote at 
annual general meetings (“AGMs”).  
In the context of BURS the owners/electorate do not have the luxury to hold AGMs because of the system of 
parliamentary democracy (StrØM, 2000). Instead, their first line of agents [parliamentarians] are tasked with the 
responsibility of interrogating on their behalf the report tabled before parliament by the Minister in accordance with 
provisions of section 29 (2) (d) of the Act. Clearly, taking agency theory argument of non-convergence of the interest of 
agent and principals, it is logical to conclude that in a long chain of delegation under a parliamentary democracy non-
convergence of interests between the owners and the managers is even greater.  
4. RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 
This study seeks to generate a debate on whether BURS governance structure as determined by the Act creates a room 
for impropriety, mismanagement, nepotism, dominance and or corruption. The study, attempts to do this by 
investigating the extent of divergence of BURS governance structure from recommendations from best corporate 
governance principles such as the King Code (2002). The second King Report of 2002 is chosen in particular because 
BURS Act came into existence in 2004. As such, the architects of BURS Act could have used King 2 Report as a guide 
if indeed they subscribed to what is deemed to be best practice corporate governance. 
First, a checklist based on King Code (2002) (SAKCC) is constructed by syntactically
1
 using the separations created by 
the King Code Commissioners generate a list of all the recommendations from the five main sections (themes) of the 
                                                          
1
 Using the separations created by the King Code Commissioners such as words, sentences, or paragraphs/main topics. 
Stemler, Steve (2001). An overview of content analysis. Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, 7(17). Retrieved 
June 11, 2015 from http://PAREonline.net/getvn.asp?v=7&n=17 .  
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Code resulting in 44 provisions. Second, the BURS Act (2004) is content analysed and each section coded (using a 
priori
2
 coding from the Code) in terms of the five main themes; Theme 1 - Boards and Directors, Theme 2 - Risk 
Management, Theme 3 – Accounting and Auditing, Theme 4 - Integrated Sustainability Reporting (see Appendix 2: 
BURS Content Analyses Template) . Third, using the SAKCC and BURS Content Analysis
3
 Template, a value of “1” is 
awarded if any of the 44 corporate governance provisions of the Code is found to have a latent meaning (e.g. an 
interpretive reading of the symbolism of the underlying physical data) similar to any section from the BURS Act (2004) 
and “0” otherwise. Four, conformance index is then computed, with zero (0 per cent) to fifty (50 per cent) indicating 
divergence by the Act from the Code while 51 to 100 per cent indicating conformance with the Code. 
Five, a discussion based on conformance index/misalignment and suppositions arising from non-conformance is then 
generated to try and draw parallels between the board characteristics as recommended by the Act and as recommended 
by the King Report (2002).  
The researchers adopt a simple dichotomous weighting scheme for the corporate governance provisions for the reasons 
noted in the literature by Ntim, Opong, Danbolt & Thomas (2012) and Magang (2012). The simple dichotomous 
weighting scheme may not be able to capture the relative significance of the various corporate governance provisions 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991; Beattie et al., 2004; Barako et al., 2006) but are adopted for the following reasons as noted 
by Ntim et al. (2009). First, no rigorous theoretical framework on which weights could be correctly assigned to different 
corporate governance provisions has been developed; as such an unweighted coding scheme avoids a situation whereby 
the SAKCC is excessively biased towards a particular set of corporate governance provisions (Marston and Shrives, 
1991; Botosan, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Second, prior literature indicates that the use of weighted and unweighted 
indices tend to give similar results (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Barako et al., 2006). Further, dichotomously scoring 
disclosures in annual reports is supported by theoretical and empirical literature (e.g. Marston and Shrives, 1991; Meek 
et al., 1995; Collet and Hrasky, 2005; Beattie and Thomson, 2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 
2012 and Magang, 2012). 
The King Code (2002) was considered to be relevant in this instance because it is touted as the best code in the sub-
Saharan region with regard to best practice governance (Mangena, 2008). Secondly, the King Code borrows heavily 
from the Cadbury Code (1992) which is also considered to be the international blue print with regard to best practice 
corporate governance (Mallin, 2004). Third, most countries in the sub-Saharan region (including Botswana) which have 
developed their own codes tend to borrow more from the code. As such best practice governance guidelines as 
prescribed by the King Code (2002) do not differ much with those developed in other sub-Saharan countries; hence the 
Code may be used as a blue print of best practice corporate governance in Botswana. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Results of scores from the SAKCC checklist are presented in Table 1: SAKCC BURS Scored. As per results from 
Table 1, BURS Act (2004) conforms to 20% of the provisions from Boards and Directors (THEME1), 0% for THEME2 
–Risk Management, 33.3% of provisions from Accounting and Auditing (THEME3) and 14.3% of provisions from 
THEME4 – Integrated Sustainability Reporting. Overall, the BURS Act of (2004) conforms to 15.9% of the 44 
provisions from the King Code (2002). 
Table 1:  SAKCC BURS Scored 
Prov#    
 1. Board and Directors (THEME1) Provisions Score Score % 
1 Does the Act mandate separation of roles of CEO/MD and board chairman 
(ROLEDU6)? 
1  
2 Does the Act recommend that the chairperson of the board be an independent 
non-executive director? 
0  
3 Does the Act recommend categorisation of capacity of each director 
accordingly e.g. Executive, non-executive & independent non-executive. 
(CAPDIR8) (Man.) 
0  
4 Does the Act recommend that the role of chairperson be held by an 
independent non-executive director? 
0  
                                                          
2 Weber, R. P. (1990). Basic Content Analysis, 2nd ed. Newbury Park, CA. 
3 Holsti, O.R. (1969). Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
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5 Does the Act recommend that BURS appoint an audit committee? (AUDC9) 
(Man.) 
1  
6 Does the Act recommend that the audit committee be chaired by an 
independent non-executive director? (AUDINEDC10) 
0  
7 Does the Act recommend that the qualifications of BURS directors be 
disclosed in the annual report? (DIRQUAL12) 
0  
8 Does the Act recommend that the experience of directors be disclosed in the 
annual report? (DIREXP13) 
0  
9 Does the Act recommend appointment of audit committee members who are 
financially literate? (Qualifications) (AUFLIT14) 
0  
10 Does the ACT recommend that BURS appoint a remuneration committee? 
(REMCOM15) (Man.) 
0  
11 Does the Act recommend that the remuneration committee be chaired by an 
independent non-executive director? (REMCINED16) 
0  
12 Does the Act recommend that the remuneration committee consist entirely of 
independent non-executive directors? (REMINEDS16) 
0  
13 Does the Act recommend that details of directors' remuneration be disclosed 
in the annual report? (DIRREM18) 
0  
14 Does the Act recommend that BURS board appoint an 
appointment/nomination committee? (NOMCOM19) 
0  
15 Does the Act recommend that the appointment committee be chaired by an 
independent non-executive director? (NOMCINED20) 
0  
16 Does the Act contain a statement/policy of how board appointments are 
made? (BAPP21) (Man.) 
1  
17 Does the Act have a corporate code of conduct on conflict of interest relating 
to directors and management? (CCCOND22) 
1  
18 Does the Act recommend that the board directors of directors to take 
independent professional advice? (DIRPAD23) 
0  
19 Does the Act recommend that BURS disclose/include in the annual report a 
statement of how performance evaluation of the board, its committees and its 
directors? (PERFEV24) 
0  
20 Does the Act recommend that gender sensitivity be taken into account in the 
appointment of board members? (DIVERSE25) 
0  
21 Does the Act recommend the minimum frequency of board meetings per 
year? (BOARDMEET27) 
1  
22 Does the Act recommend frequency of meetings of audit committee per 
annum? (AUDMEET28) 
0  
23 Does the Act recommend frequency of meetings of remuneration committee 
per annum? (AUDMEET28) 
0  
24 Does the Act recommend frequency of meetings of nomination/appointment 
committee per annum? (AUDMEET28) 
0  
25 Does the Act mandate that BURS annual report contain a list of individual 
attendance by directors? (DIRATTEND31) 
0  
 Total Score for Theme 1 5 20% 
 2. Risk Management (THEME2)   
26 Does the Act recommend that BURS should have risk management strategy? 
(RISKMAN32) 
0  
27 Does the Act recommend that BURS should have a risk committee? 
(RISKCOM33) (Man.) 
 
0  
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28 Does the Act mandate that BURS disclose the number of meetings of the risk 
committee in the annual report? (MEETRISK34) (Man.) 
0  
29 Does the Act recommend or mandate that BURS should have sound internal 
control system. (ICS35) 
0  
30 Does the Act mandate that BURS should have a risk appetite. (RISKAPP36) 0  
31 Does the Act mandate that BURS should disclose a statement on the risk 
assessment and adequacy of risk management and internal control systems in 
the annual report? (RISKASSES37 
0  
32 Does the Act mandate that there be a statement on key risk areas? 
(KEYRISK38) 
0  
33 Does the Act mandate that there be a statement on key performance 
indicators? (STATEKPIS38) 
0  
34 Does the Act mandate that BURS should have a confidential reporting 
process (whistle blowing) covering fraud and other risks? (WHISBLOW40) 
0  
 Total Score for Theme 2 0 0% 
 3. Accounting and Auditing (THEME3)   
35 Does the Act mandate that BURS should have an internal audit function? 
(INTAUD41) 
1  
36 Does the Act mandate that BURS disclose the amount paid to external 
auditors? (AUDPAY42) 
0  
37 Does the Act mandate that BURS report on the details of non-audit services 
rendered by the external auditor? (NONAUDSERV43) 
0  
 Total Score for Theme 3 1 33.3% 
 4. Integrated Sustainability Reporting (THEME4) 0  
38 Does the Act mandate BURS to have a code of ethics? (CODEETHIC44) 0  
39 Does the Act mandate that BURS should disclose that it has developed and 
implemented standards and practices in the company based on code of ethics. 
(STATSCODE45) 
0  
40 Does the Act mandate BURS to comply with corporate social investment? 
(CSI46) 
0  
41 Does the Act mandate BURS to invest in human capital development/skills 
training? (CHCD49) 
0  
42 Does the Act mandate BURS to implement a policy on HIV/AIDS? 
(HIVAIDS51) 
0  
43 Does the Act mandate BURS to implement a policy on environmental 
management? (CEM52) 
0  
44 Does the Act mandate BURS to implement a policy on health and safety 
practices? (CH&S53) 
0  
 Total Score for Theme 4 1 14.3% 
 Summary for All Themes   
 THEME1 5/25 20.0% 
 THEME2 0/9 0.0% 
 THEME3 1/3 33.3% 
 THEME4 1/7 14.3% 
 TCI (Total Conformance Index) 7/44 15.9% 
The results from Table 1 indicate a high degree of non-conformance with best practice corporate governance principles 
by the BURS Act (2004). This is not surprising because the Act is a mandatory piece of legislation crafted by the 
Botswana parliament to pursue public policy through BURS.  
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However, when compared with prior literature which investigated compliance with King Code provisions by publicly 
listed corporations, the results indicate a high contrast. For instance Ntim et al. (2012) finds an aggregate compliance of 
61% with all King Code provisions for a five year period from 2002 to 2006 for a sample of 169 firms drawn from JSE 
listed companies.  Similarly, Magang (2012) finds an average compliance index of 40.6% in 2002 using a sample of 
136 JSE listed firms and a compliance index of 74.2% for the same sample in 2008. The main evidence that emerges 
from this investigation indicates that the BURS Act of 2004 does not conform to international best practice corporate 
governance as per the contention of the researchers as evidenced by an overall conformance index of 15.9% (or 7 
provisions out of 44). These results therefore confirm the researchers‟ contention that BURS governance structure does 
not conform to international best practice such as the King Code (2002). As such, non-conformance with international 
best practice corporate governance has the potential to breed poor governance practices.  
The next subsections attempt to discuss the ramifications of non-compliance of the BURS Act to international best 
practice by examining selected sections of the Act. 
5. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
5.1 Board Appointments 
The BURS Act of 2004 is crafted in such a way that the Minister of Finance and Development Planning has absolute 
decision making authority with respect to appointment of board members (see ss 7 (1) and ss 12). This arrangement is 
contrary to recommendations from best practice corporate governance principles (e.g. King Code, 1994, 2002), because 
BURS board appointments are done by a single individual (e.g. the Minister). There are a number of potential problems 
which may arise as a result of this system of appointment as mandated by the Act.  
First, in a modern corporation and in accordance with company law, members (shareholders) have voting rights which 
include deciding on who will sit in the board of directors (King Code, 1994, 2002, 1999). In the context of BURS, the 
voting rights of owners/electorate are ceded to a single individual (the Minister). Notwithstanding the parliamentary 
system of governance which gives the Minister the power to be the ultimate appointing authority, this raises the 
questions of how possible it is that a single individual could objectively represent accurately the views of multitudes of 
BURS owners (the electorate)!  
Second, the Act presumes that any entity appointed to the position of  Minister of Finance and Development Planning, 
will be competent enough (e.g. technical and expertise) to evaluate and select individuals of the right skill, expertise and 
experience suitable for the exact demands of the task at hand (board member of BURS). This aspect is worsened by the 
fact that in Botswana there is no requirement for minimum academic qualification for those seeking to vie for any 
elective posts (see the Electoral Act, 2004). Also appointments to ministerial portfolios are not always based on an 
individual‟s technical background. For instance, a lawyer may be appointed to a portfolio on education or a medical 
doctor appointed to a ministerial portfolio on trade and in a worst case scenario an entity without any minimum 
academic qualification appointed to a ministerial post. As such entities appointed to ministerial posts may not 
necessarily possess the skill, competence and expertise in the area of corporate governance to enable them to execute 
their responsibilities diligently with regard to appointing suitable candidates for directorship positions in parastatals like 
BURS. The King Code (2002) places emphasis on the qualifications of directors as one of the attributes which may 
influence the effectiveness of the board in its oversight functions.  
Third, the blanket authority bestowed by the Act on the Minister also raises agency problems of commission or 
sabotage, when the agent takes some positive action contrary to the will or interest of the principal (StrØM, 2000),  (e.g. 
parliament and by extension the voters). The Minister may (unbeknown to him) select the wrong candidates who do not 
have the most appropriate skills, expertise and competence. Alternatively the Minister may handpick individuals on the 
basis of patronage (e.g. friendship, tribe mate or even paramours) and not skill and competence. This problem is further 
exacerbated by the fact that the Act does not provide for the requisite skills and competence of the members so 
appointed (except in the case of ss 7 (1) (e).  As a result this may result in ineffectiveness and lack of independence on 
the part of BURS board. Ultimately the board may fail to discharge its oversight role. Further, the individuals appointed 
may feel that they owe their loyalty to the Minister hence fail to act in the best interest of both BURS and the 
electorate/voters.  
In order to address this shortcoming, appointments to BURS board could be done through a select parliamentary 
committee which the Minister should be a member of. Since parliamentarians directly represent voters (owners), this 
approach is close to a shareholder-wide vote, often held at a general shareholder meeting when directors are appointed 
to company boards. 
Fourth, the Act presumes that the minister is not a self-interested individual (Eisenhardt, 1989) but rather a good 
steward who pursues a sense of worth, altruism, a good reputation, a job well done, a feeling of satisfaction and a sense 
of purpose in accordance with stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1994). It assumes that he/she will at all-time 
act in the best interests of the corporation and ultimately the principals/electorate. Essentially, the Act gives the 
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Minister, who is number three in the chain of delegation under parliamentary democracy the status of a principal (the 
electorate). Ultimately, appointees‟ [to the positions of director] owe their allegiance to the Minister and not the 
corporation in line with best practice corporate governance principles. This compromises the corporate governance 
pillar of independence which advocates for corporate executives to be free from influence (King Code, 2002). 
5.2 Board Chair 
 Section 7 of the Act also mandates that the chairperson shall be the Secretary of Financial Affairs of the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning. The recommendation from section 7 of the Act contravenes recommended best 
practice corporate governance as per the King Code (2002) with regard to appointment of board chair. Best practice 
(King Code, 2002) recommends that board chair should be appointed by board members on a full time or part time 
basis.  
The Act presumes that any individual appointed to the position of Secretary of Financial Affairs of the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning necessarily has the requisite skills, competence and acumen to hold the position of 
board chair of BURS. This assumption may not necessarily hold taking into account that appointments to top 
government posts [as is the case in most developing countries] may be based on patronage, friendship and or ruling 
political party affiliation (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003). As such incompetent, unqualified and undesirable 
individuals often get appointed in important positions in government. This practice prevalent in most developing 
countries (including Botswana), ultimately cause public institutions to gradually get weaker. As a consequence, weak 
institutions, led by partisan individuals fail to deliver on their mandate. In a worst case scenario, they cater to the vested 
interest groups, sometimes in return for monetary or other benefits.  
In the context of BURS, the board of directors may be headed by an individual who may not have the right skills and 
competence, but a mere ruling party sympathiser. In this case, the oversight functions of the board and the system of 
checks and balances may be hopelessly compromised resulting in a weak institution which fails to deliver on the 
important mandate of tax collection resulting in dire consequences for the country. 
In order to align appointment of BURS board chair with best practice, the board may be given the prerogative to select 
a chair among board members as is the case with regard to selection of deputy board chair in accordance with best 
practice governance principles such as the King Code (1994, 2002, and 2009). 
5.3 Board Composition 
The King Code (2002) recommends that the majority of directors on the board should be NEDs, independent of 
management so that shareowner interests (including minority interests) can be protected. This suggests that the King 
Code expects companies with more NEDs to have better corporate governance practices than those with fewer NEDs. 
The Act however does not stipulate the capacity of directors in terms of whether they are executive, non-executive or 
independent non-executive directors in accordance with international best practice (e.g. King Code, 1994, 2002). As 
such, it is not clearly delineated as to who monitors who as far as the governance of BURS is concerned. Board 
composition and director designations should be clearly delineated and disclosed accordingly to enhance the oversight 
function of the board of directors. 
5.4 Removal of Board Members 
Section 11 of the Act, empowers the Minister to remove directors from office under certain circumstances such as; 
absence from (without reasonable cause) three consecutive meetings of the board, inefficiency, physical or mental 
incapability which may hinder a member from discharging their duties. This recommendation creates a stranglehold on 
the BURS board by the Minister. In addition, the recommendation creates an arrangement whereby board members may 
feel that they owe their allegiance to the Minister. The Board is not in a position to remove (but recommend for removal 
to Minister) a non-performing board member. The Minister is not obligated to act on the recommendation from the 
BURS board. As such, he/she may disregard the recommendation from the BURS board. It is therefore clear that the 
BURS governance structure as mandated by the Act gives the Minister unfettered powers with regard to governance of 
BURS. 
Board removals could also be affected though the board without shareholder approval as recommended by King Code 
III (2009). BURS board could be empowered to vote to remove non-performing board members. This procedure could 
greatly reduce the stranglehold by the Minister on the BURS Board. Alternatively, the Act could be amended to 
recommend that board removals be done through a select committee of parliament with input from the board. 
5.5 Remuneration of Board Members 
The stranglehold by the Minister on BURS is also evident in operational decisions pertaining to remuneration of board 
members. For instance, BURS board of directors is not empowered to decide on matters relating to remuneration of 
board members. Remuneration of board members is subject to the approval by the Minister as stipulated under section 
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17. This is in contrast to best practice governance as recommended by the King Code (2002) whereby the board through 
a remuneration committee decides on matters pertaining to remuneration of directors. 
The Act further constrains BURS in terms of its day to day activities. As an example, BURS is constrained from raising 
loans from any source in or outside Botswana because the organisation must seek approval from the Minister and not 
the board (see section 26 (3)). Similarly, BURS is mandated to seek approval from the Minister before investing funds 
which are not immediately required for the performance of its functions (section 26 (4)).  
This structural arrangement has the potential to render BURS ineffective and unable to take advantage of business 
opportunities which may arise in its day to day business because of the requirement to seek approval from the MFDP. 
The structure of BURS has the potential to render BURS management incompetent in this era of volatility of 
commodity prices which requires expeditiousness in decision making. 
5.6 Reporting 
The Act stipulates that „BURS should report to the Minister six months after the end of the financial year by submitting 
a report of its operations, auditor‟s report accompanied by audited accounts (section 29 (1)).‟ It is not clear as to 
whether, BURS management, or the board of directors reports to the Minister. Reporting requirements as per best 
practice corporate governance principles (King Code, 2002) are such that, management of corporations report to the 
board of directors, which in turn reports to the shareholders. If it is BURS management which must report to MFDP 
then what role does BURS board play apart from making recommendations on various aspects to the Minister in an 
advisory capacity!! 
Second, financial reports contain technical details which require expert knowledge in the area of finance, accounting 
and economics. As discussed in section 5.1, the Minister may not be proficient in these areas to comprehend the content 
of the report. Further, this begs the question of, “What really is the purpose of BURS board of directors when the 
Minister performs all the board functions such as, appointment, removal, decisions on mundane daily routines of 
BURS? 
5.7 Implications of BURS Governance Structure on the Pillars of Best Practice Governance 
(Suppositions) 
The dominance of BURS governance structure by the Minister has the potential to render BURS a ‘toothless bulldog’ in 
its tax revenue collection endeavours. For instance BURS management may be reluctant to pursue big businesses 
owned by highly placed individuals in the Botswana society with power of money, influence and political connections 
to the ruling elite, who engage in illicit activities which fall within the ambit of BURS. For instance, if an individual 
with a high social class and has political connections to the ruling elite, is entangled either personally or through his/her 
business enterprises in undesirable activities e.g. contraband, drug-trafficking, money laundering, tax evasion etc., 
they may use their political connections to escape being sanctioned by government agencies (including BURS) 
responsible for combating such unlawful acts. In the case of BURS, officials may be fearful of losing their jobs and or 
being demoted because the influential errant entity (ties) may use their political connections to frustrate the efforts of 
BURS officials to indict them for their wrong doing(s).  
This supposition is premised on the governance structure of BURS which gives ultimate authority to a single individual 
to appoint board members. The well connected social elite may request [because they have access] the ultimate 
appointing authority of BURS [the Minister who also doubles as his/her ally] to impede the efforts of BURS officials to 
take legal action against them. This is made possible by the fact that the BURS board chair (Secretary of Financial 
Affairs in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning) is as per the Act a subordinate of the Minister, the 
Commissioner General (or BURS CEO) is appointed by the MFDP (at-least ultimately) and owes allegiance to the 
Minister and that all board appointments [and removals] are ultimately done by the Minister. The board appointees are 
therefore not free from the Minister‟s influence and may not have the nerve and or courage to challenge his/her 
decision(s) for fear of reprisal. Consequently, this governance structure has the potential to reduce BURS to a weak and 
ineffective organisation, where corporate governance pillars such as board independence, fairness, honesty, 
accountability among others are not observed.  
In a worst case scenario, the structure has the potential to reduce BURS to an organisation which tends to chase after 
‘the small man’ with no political clout, the power of money and a high social status while leaving the social elite with 
political connections to trample over BURS rules and regulations with impunity. 
6. SUMMARY 
This paper attempts to demonstrate that BURS governance structure and possibly governance structures of other state 
owned enterprises do not conform to international best practice corporate governance principles as recommended by the 
King Code (2002). First, using a checklist to investigate the extent of non-conformance between the BURS Act of 2004 
and King Code (2002), the paper concludes that there is a high degree of non-conformance to international best practice 
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corporate governance.  The paper also finds that BURS Act gives the Minister unlimited powers of appointment, 
dismissal and mundane decisions pertaining to the day to day activities of BURS. Perhaps, governance structures for 
BURS and also other state owned corporations were not intended to meet international best practice by their architects 
(parliamentarians). If they were not meant to meet international best practice (as decreed by the architects), do 
governance standards obtaining in these corporations (SOEs) conform to best practice as per the views of 
owners/principals (electorate) of these corporations? If not, what remedies are available to the owners/principals of 
these corporations to ensure adherence to best practice? From an agency theory perspective, the long chain of 
delegation under a parliamentary democracy brings about non-convergence of interests between the principals 
(owners/electorate) and the agents and or agents of agents in the case of BURS and other SOEs. Unlike in a public 
limited corporation, the principals do not have an opportunity to demand accountability from their direct agents 
(parliamentarians) annually at the AGM. This only happens once every four or five years depending on the frequency 
with which elections are held in the country. 
Second, when the BURS Act was developed in 2004, several international best practice corporate governance principles 
had been developed such as the Cadbury Code (1992), Greenbury Code (1995), Hampel Report (1998), and Higgs 
Report (2003) which were later combined to form the UK Combined Code (2003). In addition the South African King 
Code (1994 and 2002) was in existence. As such, the architects of BURS Act of 2004 could have drawn from 
international best practice to craft governance structures which embrace good governance. For instance, the architects 
could have crafted governance structures which promote independence, transparency, accountability, responsibility and 
fairness among others. However, these principles were overlooked by the Botswana Parliament in favour of a 
governance structure which gives unfettered powers to an individual e.g. the Minister of Finance and Development 
Planning under whose portfolio BURS falls. This is surprising given that, in recent years one of the strategies to try and 
increase private sector involvement in her economy, Botswana has been on the drive to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) by actively wooing investors through Botswana Investment and Trade Centre (BITC)
4
 to come and invest in 
Botswana. For instance, some of the attributes which had been touted as indicators of Botswana as a safe and suitable 
destination for investment capital include inter alia: stable economy, low inflation, low corruption, low tax regime etc.  
The researchers contend that failure to demonstrate that the country subscribes to international best practice by for 
instance developing Acts modelled along international best practice corporate governance, will defeat the drive to 
attract FDI. Further, governance structures which concentrate power in the hands of a single individual create an 
unfavourable perception in the minds of investors ultimately leading to a nosedive in the level of confidence investors 
have about Botswana as a safe and suitable destination for investment capital. 
Third, this paper makes recommendations with regard to enhancing BURS governance structure and possibly 
governance structures of other SOEs as follows; (1) appointments to BURS board could be done through a select 
parliamentary committee. The Minister may be part of the committee because BURS falls under his/her portfolio. Since 
parliamentarians directly represent voters (owners), this approach is close to a shareholder-wide vote, often held at 
AGMs when directors are appointed to company boards. (2) BURS board of directors should be empowered (through 
an amendment of the Act) to enable it to function in accordance with international best practice. (3) Reporting at BURS 
should be structured such that management reports to the board of directors, which in turn reports to the select 
parliamentary committee responsible for BURS. (4) BURS management and the board of directors should be 
empowered to deal with decisions relating to fundraising for BURS and investment of BURS funds. (5) The Act should 
also be amended to empower BURS to retain a certain percentage of the revenue generated from its tax collection 
activities as opposed to receiving an amount appropriated by Parliament (ss. 26 of the Act). This recommendation has 
the potential to grant some level of autonomy to BURS. The recommendation may also motivate BURS employees to 
effectively discharge their mandate because an increase in revenue collected will translate into an increase in revenue 
for BURS and ultimately an increase in resources to carry out organisational objectives. 
These recommendations, have an overall effect of making BURS an effective organisation which is not hampered by 
status power, political connections and or money power in its tax collection endeavours. 
Future research could investigate governance structures of other revenue authority organisations across the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) region to determine whether these are crafted along similar lines of those of 
BURS. Secondly, future research could attempt to investigate why architects of Acts of Parliament favour governance 
structures which give unfettered power(s) to a single individual (e.g. the Minister under whose portfolio a SOE falls). 
                                                          
4
 BITC is a parastatal/SOE formed to promote, encourage and facilitate export development and promote, attract, 
encourage and facilitate local and foreign investment promotion in Botswana (BITC Act, 2011, ss 16). BITC seeks to 
position Botswana as an investment destination of choice for both local and international investors. Among its 
responsibilities it seeks to develop new competitive investment and trade promotion models and to have Botswana as an 
investment destination of choice (BITC, 2015).  
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Research could also attempt to investigate Acts of other SOEs in Botswana to determine whether they also concentrate 
power in a single individual.  
A limitation of the present study is that it investigates adherence to international best practice at BURS based on a 
comparison between what is mandated by the Act and a comparison with the King Code (2002) which is self-
regulatory. In practice, what is mandated by the Act may not necessarily be the practice at BURS and vice versa. An 
empirical investigation of what obtains at BURS could give more insights on the extent of departure/convergence with 
international best practice. 
7. REFERENCES 
[1] Aguilera, R. V. & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2004), Codes of Good Governance Worldwide: What was the Trigger? 
Organization Studies, 25, 417-446. 
[2] Alves, C. & Mendes, V. (2004), Corporate Governance Policy and Company Performance: the Portuguese 
case. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12, 290-301. 
[3] Arcot, S., Bruno, V. & Faure-Grimaud, A. (2010), Corporate governance in the UK: Is the comply or explain 
approach working? International Review of Law and Economics, 30, 193-201. 
[4] Berle, A. A. & Means, C. G. (eds.) (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World. 
[5] Burs (2004a), Botswana Unified Revenue Services Act of 2004. Found at: 
http://www.burs.org.bw/phocadownload/Revenue_laws/CAP%2053-
03%20Botswana%20Unified%20Revenue%20Services%20Act.pdf, Accessed; 20th June 2014. 
[6] Burs (2004b), Botswana Unified Revenue Services Act, 2004; Government Printers, Gaborone. Found at: 
http://www.burs.org.bw/phocadownload/Revenue_laws/CAP%2053-
03%20Botswana%20Unified%20Revenue%20Services%20Act.pdf Accessed: July, 2013. 
[7] Burton, P. (2000), Antecedents and Consequences of Corporate Governance Structures. Corporate 
Governance An International Review, 8, 194-203. 
[8] Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance (1999), CACG Guidelines: Principles of Corporate 
Governance in the Commonwealth (Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance). Found at : 
http://www.ecseonline.com/PDF/CACG%20Guidelines%20-
%20Principles%20for%20Corporate%20Governance%20in%20the%20Commonwealth.pdf [Accessed 15 
October 2007]. 
[9] Conyon, M. J. & Mallin, C. A. (1997), A review of compliance with Cadbury. Journal of General 
Management, 22, 24-37. 
[10] Deutsche Bank (2002), Global corporate governance: Valuing corporate governance in South Africa. London, 
UK: Deutsche Bank AG. 
[11] Donaldson, L. & Davis, J. H. (1994), Boards and Company Performance - Research Challenges the 
Conventional Wisdom. Corporate Governance, 2, 151-160. 
[12] Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989), Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14, 
57-74. 
[13] Fama, E. F. (1980), Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-
307. 
[14] Fama, E. F. & Jensen, M. C. (1983), "Separation of ownership and control" Journal of Law & Economics, 26, 
301-325. 
[15] Fernández-Rodríguez, E., Gómez-Ansón, S. & Cuervo-García, Á. (2004), The Stock Market Reaction to the 
Introduction of Best Practices Codes by Spanish Firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12, 
29-46. 
[16] King Report (1994), Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa. Parklands: Institute of Directors of 
South Africa. 
[17] King Report (2002), Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa. Parklands: Institute of Directors of 
South Africa. 
[18] King Report (2009), Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa. Parklands: Institute of Directors of 
South Africa. 
                                            Journal of Research in Business, Economics and Management (JRBEM)                             
ISSN: 2395-2210 
Volume 7, Issue 1 available at www.scitecresearch.com/journals/index.php/jrbem/index                                         1054   
[19] Kpmg (2003), Survey of Integrated Sustainability Reporting in South Africa, Parktown SA. . 
[20] Kpmg (2004), Survey of Integrated Sustainability Reporting in South Africa, Parktown SA. 
[21] Kpmg (2005), Hong Kong's Corporate Governance Reform Found at 
http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/WhatWeDo/Audit-Committee-Institute-
China/Documents/publication/Corporate-Governance-Reports-200505.pdf Accessed: 20th October, 2008. 
[22] Kpmg (2006), Survey of Integrated Sustainability Reporting in South Africa, Parktown SA. Found at: 
http://www.kpmg.co.za/images/naledi/pdf%20documents/mc1672%20sustainability%20survey%2036pg.pdf 
[23] Krambia-Kapardis, M. & Psaros, J. (2006), The Implementation of Corporate Governance Principles in an 
Emerging Economy: a critique of the situation in Cyprus. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
14, 126-139. 
[24] Lijphart, A. (1984), Democracies: Patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one 
countries, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
[25] Lijphart, A. (1992), Parliamentary versus presidential government, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[26] Macneil, I. & Li, X. (2006), "Comply or Explain": market discipline and non-compliance with the Combined 
Code. Corporate Governance, 14, 486-495. 
[27] Magang, T. I. T. (2012), Culture and Corporate Governace in South Africa. PhD, University of Bradford. 
[28] Mallin, C. A. (ed.) (2004). Corporate Governance Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
[29] Ntim, C. G. (2009), Internal corporate Governance Structures and Firm Financial Performance: Evidence 
from South African Listed Firms. Doctor of Philosophy, University of Glasgow. 
[30] Ntim, C. G., Opong, K. K., Danbolt, J. & Thomas, D. A. (2012), Voluntary corporate governance disclosures 
by post‐Apartheid South African corporations. Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 13, 122-144. 
[31] Oecd (2004), OECD Principles of Corporate governance. Paris, France: OECD Publications Service. 
[32] Okeahalam, C. C. (2004), Corporate governance and disclosure in Africa: Issues and challenges. Journal of 
Financial Regulation and Compliance, 12, 359-370. 
[33] Okeahalam, C. C. & Akinboade, O. A. (2003), A Review of Corporate Governance in Africa: Literature, 
Issues and Challenges. Paper prepared for the Global Corporate Governance Forum. 
[34] Steffani, W. (1979), Parlamentarische and prasidielle Demokratie., Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen. 
[35] Strøm, K. (2000), Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. European Journal of Political 
Research, 37, 261-289. 
[36] Talaulicar, T. & V. Werder, A. (2008), Patterns of Compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16, 255-273. 
[37] Uk Combined Code (2003), The Combined Code on Corporate Governance by Financial Reporting Council. 
Found at: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/combined_code_final.pdf Accessed: 10th January, 2015. 
[38] Weir, C. & Laing, D. (2000), The Performance-Governance Relationship: The Effects of Cadbury Compliance 
on UK Quoted Companies. Journal of Management and Governance, 4, 265-281. 
[39] Werder, A. V., Talaulicar, T. & Kolat, G. L. (2005), Compliance with the German Corporate Governance 
Code: an empirical analysis of the compliance statements by German listed companies. Corporate 
Governance, 13, 178-187. 
                                            Journal of Research in Business, Economics and Management (JRBEM)                             ISSN: 2395-2210 
Volume 7, Issue 1 available at www.scitecresearch.com/journals/index.php/jrbem/index                                         1055   
Appendices 
Appendix 1: South African King Code Checklist (SKCC) 2002 
Board and Directors (THEME1) Pg. No. Key Words Measurement 
1. Does the Act mandate separation of roles of CEO/MD and board 
chairman (ROLEDU6)? 
2.3.3 pp 24 
Board 
Chairman/CEO/MD, 
Directorate, Directors 
A binary number of 1 if the roles of chairperson 
and CEO/MD of a firm are split at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
2. Does the Act recommend that the chairperson of the board be an 
independent non-executive director? 
   
3. Does the Act recommend categorisation of capacity of each 
director accordingly e.g. Executive, non-executive & independent 
non-executive. (CAPDIR8) (Man.) 
2.4.3 pp 24 Directors, directorate 
A binary of 1 if a narrative that classifies 
directors into executive, non-executive and 
INEDs is disclosed in the firm‟s annual report at 
the end of its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
4. Does the Act recommend that the role of chairperson be held by 
an independent non-executive director? 
   
5. Does the Act recommend that BURS appoint an audit committee? 
(AUDC9) (Man.) 
3.3 pp 33 Committees, audit 
A binary of 1 if a list of audit committee 
members is disclosed or a narrative on the audit 
committee members is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
6. Does the Act recommend that the audit committee be chaired by 
an independent non-executive director? (AUDINEDC10) 
3.3.2 pp 33 Committees, audit, chair 
A binary of 1 if the audit committee chair is 
categorised as  an INED and 0 otherwise 
7. Does the Act recommend that the qualifications of BURS 
directors be disclosed in the annual report? (DIRQUAL12) 
2.4.2 pp 26 
Directors, qualification, 
directorate 
A binary of 1 if the qualifications of directors 
are disclosed under their profile in the annual 
report or 0 otherwise. 
8. Does the Act recommend that the experience of directors be 
disclosed in the annual report? (DIREXP13) 
2.4.2 pp 26 
Experience, directors 
directorate 
A binary of 1 if the experience of directors is 
disclosed in the annual report and 0 otherwise. 
9. Does the Act recommend appointment of audit committee 
members who are financially literate? (Qualifications) 
(AUFLIT14) 
2.4.2 pp 26 
Audit, committees, 
qualification 
A binary of 1 if the audit committee members 
have financial qualifications 
(accounting/financial/business) qualifications 
and 0 otherwise. 
10. Does the ACT recommend that BURS appoint a remuneration 
committee? (REMCOM15) (Man.) 
2.5.2 pp 28 
Remuneration, 
compensation, 
committees 
A binary of 1 if a list of remuneration 
committee members or a narrative is disclosed 
in the annual report and 0 otherwise. 
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11. Does the Act recommend that the remuneration committee be 
chaired by an independent non-executive director? 
(REMCINED16) 
2.5.2 pp 28 
Remuneration, 
compensation, 
committee, chair, 
directors 
A binary of 1 if the audit committee chair is 
categorised as an INED in the annual report and 
0 otherwise. 
12. Does the Act recommend that the remuneration committee consist 
entirely of independent non-executive directors? (REMINEDS16) 
3.1 pp 190 
Remuneration, 
compensation, 
committee, directors 
A binary of 1 if the list of remuneration 
committee members consists entirely of INEDs 
and 0 otherwise. 
13. Does the Act recommend that details of directors‟ remuneration 
be disclosed in the annual report? (DIRREM18) 
2.5 pp 28 
Remuneration, 
compensation, directors 
A binary of 1 if director remuneration is 
disclosed in the annual report and 0 otherwise. 
14. Does the Act recommend that BURS board appoint an 
appointment/nomination committee? (NOMCOM19) 
4.1 pp 197 
Nomination, 
appointment, selection, 
committee 
A binary of 1 if a nomination/appointment 
committee or a narrative is disclosed on the 
committee and 0 otherwise. 
15. Does the Act recommend that the appointment committee be 
chaired by an independent non-executive director? 
(NOMCINED20) 
4.1 pp 197 
Nomination, 
appointment, selection, 
chair 
A binary of 1 if the audit committee chair is an 
INED and 0 otherwise. 
16. Does the Act contain a statement/policy of how board 
appointments are made? (BAPP21) (Man.) 
4.1 pp 197 
Board 
appointments/selection 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on board 
appointments is provided (where there is no 
nomination committee) and 0 otherwise. 
17. Does the Act have a corporate code of conduct on conflict of 
interest relating to directors and management? (CCCOND22) 
9.1 pp 41 Code of Ethics, Code 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on the code of 
conduct/ethics is disclosed in the annual report 
and 0 if otherwise. 
18. Does the Act recommend that the board directors of directors to 
take independent professional advice? (DIRPAD23) 
2.1.7 pp 24 
Professional advice, 
board training 
A binary of 1 if a narrative stating that the board 
has an agreed procedure whereby directors may 
take independent professional advice, if 
necessary, at the company‟s expense and 0 
otherwise. 
19. Does the Act recommend that BURS disclose/include in the 
annual report a statement of how performance evaluation of the 
board, its committees and its directors? (PERFEV24) 
2.8 pp 31 
Performance 
evaluation/assessment, 
director evaluation 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on the evaluation of 
the performance and effectiveness of a firm‟s 
board as whole individual directors is disclosed 
in the annual report, or otherwise. 
20. Does the Act recommend that gender sensitivity be taken into 
account in the appointment of board members? (DIVERSE25) 
7.1 pp 127 
Directorate, diversity, 
board, directorate 
A binary of 1 if the board of directors consisted 
of a combination of any number of black and 
white directors at the end of the financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
21. Does the Act recommend the minimum frequency of board 
meetings per year? (BOARDMEET27) 
2.6 pp 30 
Board meetings, 
frequency 
A binary of 1 if a narrative stating that the board 
met four times or more during the financial 
year, 0 otherwise. 
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22. Does the Act recommend frequency of meetings of audit 
committee per annum? (AUDMEET28) 
2.7 pp 30 
Board committee 
meetings, audit, 
frequency 
A binary of 1 if a narrative of frequency of 
meetings of the audit committee is disclosed in 
the annual report, 0 otherwise. 
23. Does the Act recommend frequency of meetings of remuneration 
committee per annum? (AUDMEET28) 
2.7 pp 30 
Board committee 
meetings, remuneration, 
frequency 
A binary of 1 if a narrative of frequency of 
meetings of the remuneration committee is 
disclosed in the annual report, 0 0therwise. 
24. Does the Act recommend frequency of meetings of 
nomination/appointment committee per annum? (AUDMEET28) 
2.7 pp 30 
Board committee 
meetings, 
appointment/nomination/
selection, frequency 
A binary of 1 if a narrative of frequency of 
meetings of the appointment/nomination 
committee is disclosed in the annual report, 0 
0therwise. 
25. Does the Act mandate that BURS annual report contain a list of 
individual attendance by directors? (DIRATTEND31) 
2.6 pp 30 
Board meetings,  
frequency 
A binary of 1 if a narrative of director 
attendance is disclosed in the annual report, 0 
otherwise. 
2. Risk Management (THEME2) 
26. Does the Act recommend that BURS should to have risk 
management strategy? (RISKMAN32) 
2.1 pp 77 
Risk management, 
strategy 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on a system of total 
process of risk management, which includes a 
related system of internal control, is disclosed in 
the annual report, 0 otherwise. 
27. Does the Act recommend that BURS should have a risk 
committee? (RISKCOM33) (Man.) 
7.1 pp 77, 209 
Risk management 
committee, risk 
committee 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on a dedicated risk 
management committee is disclosed in the 
annual report, 0 otherwise. 
28. Does the Act mandate that BURS disclose the number of meetings 
of the risk committee in the annual report? (MEETRISK34) 
(Man.) 
7.4  pp 77, 211 
Risk committee, 
meetings 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on the frequency risk 
committee meetings is disclosed in the annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
29. Does the Act recommend or mandate that BURS should have 
sound internal control system. (ICS35) 
3.1 pp 78 Internal control, controls 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on the structure, 
work and authority flows, people and 
management information system is in place, is 
disclosed in the annual reports, 0 otherwise. 
30. Does the Act mandate that BURS should have a risk appetite. 
(RISKAPP36) 
3.1.2 pp 78 Risks, tolerance, appetite A binary of 1 if a narrative on either 
termination, transfer, acceptance (tolerance) or 
mitigation through a system of appropriate 
internal controls is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
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31. Does the Act mandate that BURS should disclose a statement on 
the risk assessment and adequacy of risk management and internal 
control systems in the annual report? (RISKASSES37 
  
A binary of 1 if a narrative which demonstrate 
that the company has dealt 
comprehensively with the issues of risk 
management and internal control e.g. 
appropriate disclosure on matters such as risk 
tolerance and the risk management process in 
the annual report, 0 otherwise 
 
 
32. Does the Act mandate that there be a statement on key risk areas? 
(KEYRISK38) 
81 
Key risk areas, risks, risk 
management 
A binary of 1 if a narrative containing a list of 
risks faced by the company is disclosed in the 
annual report, 0 otherwise. 
33. Does the Act mandate that there be a statement on key 
performance indicators? (STATEKPIS38) 
80 
Key performance 
indicators, risk 
management, key risks 
A binary of 1 if  narrative which indicates that 
the firm has identified key risk areas and key 
performance indicators of the company and 
monitor these factors as part of a regular review 
of processes and procedures to ensure the 
effectiveness of its internal systems of control, 0 
otherwise. 
34. Does the Act mandate that BURS should have a confidential 
reporting process (whistle blowing) covering fraud and other 
risks? (WHISBLOW40) 
81 
Whistle, confidential 
reporting, hot line 
A binary of 1 if a narrative stating that there are 
established easily accessible “whistle-
blowing”/hot line/confidential reporting 
channels, 0 otherwise. 
3. Accounting and Auditing (THEME3) 
35. Does the Act mandate that BURS should have an internal audit 
function? (INTAUD41) 
4.1 pp 128 Internal audit, audit 
A binary of 1 if a narrative stating the existence 
of an internal audit function, 0 otherwise. 
36. Does the Act mandate that BURS disclose the amount paid to 
external auditors? (AUDPAY42) 
126 
Audit fee, external 
auditors, audit payment 
A binary of 1 if the amount paid to external 
auditors is disclosed in the financial statements 
(income statement), 0 otherwise. 
37. Does the Act mandate that BURS report on the details of non-
audit services rendered by the external auditor? 
(NONAUDSERV43) 
126 
Non-audit services, audit 
services 
A binary of 1 if a narrative is disclosed in the 
annual reports indicating the kind of services 
rendered by auditors over and above the normal 
audit services, 0 otherwise. 
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4. THEME4 Integrated Sustainability Reporting 
38. Does the Act mandate BURS to have a code of ethics? 
(CODEETHIC44) 
pp 101 Code, ethics, conduct 
A binary of 1 if a narrative which shows the 
existence of a clearly defined and documented 
code of ethics, stating the principles, norms, and 
standards that a firm promotes for the guidance 
and conduct of its activities, internal relations 
and interactions, with external stakeholders in 
accordance with established values, is disclosed 
in the annual report, 0 otherwise. 
39. Does the Act mandate that BURS should disclose that it has 
developed and implemented standards and practices in the 
company based on code of ethics. (STATSCODE45) 
Pp 102 Standards, codes, ethics 
A binary of 1 if a narrative explaining what is 
acceptable, and not acceptable practice, or 
stating corporate ethical standards, stating how 
ethical infringements are identified, talks of 
promotion of ethical conduct, or how conflicts 
are resolved; is disclosed and 0, otherwise. 
 
40. Does the Act mandate BURS to comply with corporate social 
investment? (CSI46) 
pp 117 Social, investment 
A binary of 1 if a narrative explaining the type 
of community investment and amount of money 
spent of the project, or expenditure of a social 
nature is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
41. Does the Act mandate BURS to invest in human capital 
development/skills training? (CHCD49) 
Pp113-115 
Kills training, skills 
development 
A binary of 1, if a narrative stating expenditure 
on development of staff/staff training or a policy 
on skills development, 0 otherwise. 
42. Does the Act mandate BURS to implement a policy on 
HIV/AIDS? (HIVAIDS51) 
Pp109 HIV/AIDS 
A binary of 1, if a narrative stating the existence 
of an HIV/AIDS policy, assistance rendered to 
HIV/AIDS projects or participation of the 
company on HIV/AIDS national projects, 0 
otherwise. 
43. Does the Act mandate BURS to implement a policy on 
environmental management? (CEM52) 
Pp106 
Environment 
management 
A binary of 1, if a narrative stating 
environmental management issues addressed or 
expenditure towards environmental 
management, 0 otherwise. 
44. Does the Act mandate BURS to implement a policy on health and 
safety practices? (CH&S53) 
Pp106 SHE, health, safety 
A binary of 1, if a narrative explaining the 
integration of business processes and safety, 
health, and environmental management is 
disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 2: Burs Content Analysis Template 
 
CG Theme (Code) BURS Act 
Board Appointment ss 7 (1) Board members “shall be appointed by the Minister” 
Board Size ss 7 – Seven members 
Board Composition 1. ss 7 (1) (a) the Secretary of Financial Affairs of the MFDP 
 2. ss 7 (1) (b) representative of ministry of Trade and Industry 
 3. ss 7 (1) (c) a Commissioner General/CEO 
 4. ss 7 (1) (d) a representative of BoB 
 5. ss 7 (1) (e) 3 members appointed from private sector based on knowledge of and experience on financial, economics, business or legal 
affairs 
Board Chair  ss 7 (1) (a) the Secretary of Financial Affairs of the MFDP 
Board Vice Chair  Elected by BoD from existing members – ss 7 (2) 
CEO/CG Appointed by the Minister on recommendation by BoD – ss 22 (1) 
Terms of conditions of 
CEO/CG 
Approved by the Minister on recommendation by BoD – ss 22 (2) 
Duties of CEO/CG  Section 23 
Tenure of CEO/CG 5 years subject to renewal for a second term – ss 24 (1) 
Removal of CEO/CG By the Minister on recommendation from BoD – ss 24 (2) 
Powers & Functions of BoD  Limited to administrative and operational matters; requesting information from CG, giving direction w.r.t. operational policies & 
implementation of policies and approval of BURS structures, admin issues & approval of code of conduct – ss 8 (1) (a) to (e).  
Tenure of Office 4 Years may be for members appointed from private sector. May be renewed for another term – ss 9  
Disqualification from BoD ss 10 – bankruptcy, criminal activity, tax evasion, employee of BURS except under ss 7(1)(a) and (c), political activity 
Removal & Resignation from 
BoD 
 ss 11 – empowers the Minister to remove member for absence without reasonable cause in three consecutive meetings of the board, 
inefficiency, physical or mental incapability contravention of the BURS Act, unprofessional conduct as pronounced by relevant bodies and 
failure to declare interests in accordance with section 13 of the Act (see ss 11(1) (a) to (g)).    
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Removal & Resignation from 
BoD 
ss 7 (1) (e) 3 members appointed from private sector may resign by giving 30 days‟ notice or members‟ period of appointment expires. 
Disclosure of Interest Board members required to do so – by ss 13 of the Act. Penalty P10,000 or 1 jail term or both. 
Frequency of Board Meetings  4 Times a year – ss 14 (2) 
Meetings Board Chairperson may convene an ordinary meeting – giving 7 days‟ notice – ss 14 (3) 
Board Proceedings  Board Free to regulate its proceedings – ss 14 (1) & ss 14 (9) 
Board Quorum  4 members – ss 14 (5) 
Board Decisions  By majority of board members present – ss 14 (7) 
Board Committees  Board may appoint committees as it deems fit – ss 15(1) 
 Board may delegate its work to board committees – ss 15 (2) 
Board shall appoint chairman of each committee – ss 15 (3) 
External Expert Advice Board may co-opt persons to render advice during proceedings – ss 16(1) 
Board Remuneration Board payments (allowances) subject to approval by the Minister – ss 17. 
Board Secretary Appointed by the BoD – ss 18 
Functions Board Secretary  Reports to BoD – ss 19, 20 & 21 
Funding of BURS Parliament Appropriations – ss 26 (1)  
Sourcing External Funding  Subject to approval by the Minister – ss 26 (3) 
Investment of Extra Funds by 
BURS 
Subject to approval by the Minister – ss 26 (4) 
Reporting BURS/Revenue Service shall report to the Minister within six months of end of financial year – ss 29 (1). Report on the operations of BURS, 
auditors report and audited financial accounts – ss 29 (1). 
Confidentiality  Ss – 32 (1) 
 
